Denver Law Review
Volume 21

Issue 8

Article 2

January 1944

The New International Code
W. W. Grant

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
W. W. Grant, The New International Code, 21 Dicta 187 (1944).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

DICTA

187

The New International Code
BY W. W.

GRANT*

The world political structure has always been irresponsible.
is true for three reasons, among others:

This

A. It has never had any definite form or type of organization, and
has been based on rights rather than duties.
B. It has no well-defined jurisdiction, i. e., among other things
with reference to dependencies, colonies, mandated territories, conditional independents, directorates, vassal states, etc.; and
C.
decrees.

It has never had any impartial means of enforcement of its

To a considerable degree this has resulted from the lack of an international code which would meet the three requirements referred to.
The preservation of the freedom of nations as such is dependent
in its degree on the same requirements as exist with regard to individual
liberty-international freedom as opposed to intranational freedom.
The principles of freedom differ only in degree. Of freedom of the individual, we say the freedom of one person ends where that of the next
begins. Complete individual liberty to the point of license is not the
test, but the common good. The greatest amount of freedom for the
greatest number. This is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights in this country, for the enforcement of which we have independent courts.
Nevertheless, individuals submit to all kinds of limitations, restrictions and regulations for the enjoyment of their liberties. To drive a
car, one submits to limitations with reference to speed, parking, rights
of way, rules of the road, etc. Otherwise no one would be free to drive
a car-it would be too hazardous. People used to dump garbage in the
streets, with resulting epidemics. Now we have a sanitary code that we
all obey. No one may today build a slaughter house in a residence or
business district. In short, there are all kinds of restraints which are
absolutely necessary when people live together in large numbers. These
restraints make it possible for them to enjoy rights which they otherwise
could not do at all. As people live closer and closer together liberty, freedom of action, is more and more restricted, and it has to be. If each individual were possessed of absolute freedom of action, the result would be
anarchy. We have to have laws and codes, because liberty exists only
under law.
The same general observations hold true with reference to international relations. Most of the discussions we hear today concern types of
organizations. Extent of jurisdiction and means of enforcement are
*Of the Denver bar.
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largely ignored. The most frequent argument against international organization is that we must not surrender an absolute sovereignty.
Surrender of sovereignty-what does it mean? There is no legal
method I know of whereby we can surrender our sovereignty. We can
of course agree not to use power, and that is different from surrendering
it. Every treaty we have entered into involved some kind of a selfimposed limitation.
It is curious that the same kind of an atmosphere existed on the
part of the states when our Constitution was born. George Mason, of
Virginia, one of the three who did not sign the Constitution, made the
ablest and most coherent argument against jt. In summary, he contended
the people would not be secure in the enjoyment and benefit of the common law because it was guaranteed only by the states, and the laws of
the general government would be paramount to the laws of the several
states-which latter, in itself, was an objection. In addition, he contended that the federal judiciary would absorb the judiciaries of the several states, and that state legislatures would be restrained from laying
export duties on their own products, etc.
Pinckney said: "Nothing but confusion and contrariety could
spring from the experiment. The states will never agree in their plans.
The deputies to a second convention coming together under the discordant impressions of their constituents will never agree." 1 Pinckney went
on to say he was not without objections to the plan, but apprehending
the danger of general confusion and an ultimate decision by the sword,
he should give it his approval.
Franklin said there were some things he did not approve of in the
plan, but he was not sure he would never approve of them. However,
the older he grew the more he doubted his own judgment and the more
respect he had for the judgment of others. Most men as well as most
sects in religion thought themselves in possession of all truth. Steel, a
Protestant, in a dedication, tells the Pope "that the only difference between our churches in their opinions of the certainty of their doctrine is,
the Church of Rome is infallible, and the Church of England is never
wrong." He expresses the wish that every member of the convention
who had objections to the Constitution would, on this occasion, doubt
a little of his infallibility-an admirable attitude at the present time in
the matter of an international organization.
Americans have addressed themselves to all kinds of material problems with conspicuous success, such as science, invention, industry, business problems, etc. They have never wholeheartedly devoted themselves
to the solution of human relationships. The result is, they have always
had something second-rate.
'Mason wanted an adjournment and a second convention.
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It is the insistence on absolutes that makes wars. Democracy is not
something divine, every phase of which must be accepted without argument, like the Divine Right of Kings, or Fascism or National Socialism.
The difference between Nazism and Democracy is the difference between
Germany and America, and that is the difference between credulous acceptance and critical inquiry. When political truth is held to be absolute,
and is the standard by which loyalty is measured, the only solution is
force.
Every nation opposes submission of what it calls its vital interests
to the judgment of other states. Every nation considers every other nation prejudiced, or incompetent to judge. An atmosphere of mutual
distrust exists. That is the kind of atmosphere which exists today, and
the same kind of atmosphere in which our Constitution came into being.
Individual freedom is relative. The freedom of one is limited by
the freedom of others. The freedom of cities and communities in the
United States is relative. The only way in which nations in the family
of nations can enjoy freedom is that it shall be relative. In other words,
duties and responsibilities must be co-equal with rights.
The absolute as applied to anything is unchangeable, and can be
neither limited nor regulated. As applied to the rights of nations it is
synonymous with international anarchy-a condition that makes war
inevitable. We must come to regard the independence of states as relative. When sixty nations, proudly proclaiming the absolute nature of
their rights, rush periodically into war, they are not free-except to commit suicide. While boasting that they recognize no law but their own
will, they nevertheless do obey one law-they are slaves to their own
lawlessness.
Liberty does not exist with reference either to an individual or a
nation, without freedom from absolutes. We must have some form of
international organization to maintain peace. When a row breaks out
in some small country whose people we don't know and whose language
we don't understand, it can put your boy into a uniform, into the cockpit of a bomber, and perhaps into a grave under an alien sky. Those are
the consequences of the absolute.
People are always saying that human nature does not change.
That is the argument of defeatism. Social organizations do change.
And they have been changing ever since the advent of the first man. In
the evolution of society the unit of social organization constantly has
been changing-from the individual to the family, to the tribe, to the
village, to the town, to the city, to the county, to the state, and to the
nation. At every change, we were told that human nature does not
change. Yet the evolution of history steadily passed them by. Why
should we suppose, in the light of that evolution, that the present na-
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tional setup of the world is the last word? Does history and evolution
stop here, and stand still? Is there any reason to suppose that further
changes, that social units of greater size and greater complexity will not
come to pass? History may repeat itself in certain superficialities of
method and experience, but it does not go back, and the law goes along
with it. The only constant in history has been change.
In the Middle Ages we had the wagers of law, trials by fire, by
water, compurgation, trials by combat, etc. For the settlement of the
rights of individuals they have vanished. As between nations, however,
we have not progressed beyond the stage of trial by combat. That does
not mean we will not progress beyond it. After all, international law,
as such, has been in existence less than five hundred years in the whole
period of recorded history, and it must develop and evolve as did the
law within nations.
Nothing was done during the last war in the way of plans for an
international order till the fighting was over. Then the League of Nations was sprung upon the world without adequate opportunity for
thought or discussion. This time, under the leadership of Judge Manley
Hudson, Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice and
Professor of International Law at Harvard, a code has been worked out
by groups in eleven American and two Canadian cities. I had the opportunity of being a member of the Denver group. The culmination of
some two years work was announced March 27, 1944, by the Carnegie
Foundation.
This code is simple in structure. It has been translated in half a
dozen foreign languages, and articles have appeared in dozens of papers
and magazines.
There are six postulates constituting the essentials of an effective
legal order in a world of states. These are the premises on which are
based ten principles which form the basis of the international law of the
future, and emphasize the duties of states as well as their rights. There
are then twenty-three proposals which are suggestions to make the principles effective.
This code has been printed by the American Bar Association and
distributed with its Journal. Every lawyer must read it for himself.
Suffice it to say that the scheme is very elastic. It makes use of
various existing organizations such as the Postal Union, I.L.O. and others, and makes provision for the creation of new agencies to fill special
needs. There are no ready-made solutions, but methods are provided by
which they can be worked out in the future according to the "wisdom

of the times."
As illustrative, postulate 5 provides: "Any use of force or any
threat to use force by a state in its relations with another state is a matter
of concern to the community of states."
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Principle 8 reads as follows:
"Each state has a legal duty to take, in co-operation with
other-states, such measures as may be prescribed by the competent
agency of the community of states for preventing or suppressing
the use of force by any state in its relations with another state."
It will be noted that the principle springs directly from the postulate. The proposals in this connection consist in provisions for a court
of international justice, a definition of its jurisdiction, and means for
the enforcement of its decrees. It will thus be seen that the whole procedure is logical and orderly, and the various steps are more or less
incontrovertible.
Space does not permit amplification of the various postulates, principles and proposals. I refer you to the printed copy.
When the history of this age is written, what it is and what it has
accomplished will be more visible from its laws than from the figures of
men. We will have the Social Security, bank guaranties, and matters of
that sort. I~n the field of international adjustment and development we
have lived in the age of two great wars, and this period may well come
to be known as that in which men struggled to devise means and methods for the preservation of peace, and these means and methods will be
found in our international laws.
"Since the origin of society, each unit of our race has struggled
on in his allotted path through joys and griefs fashioned for the
most part by the invisible network of habits, customs, and statutes
which surround him on every side and silently shape his daily actions. Thus, the history of jurisprudence becomes the history of
the life of man, and the society of distant ages is more distinctly
presented to us in the crabbed sentences of codes than in the flowing
rhetoric of the historian." The Wager of Law, by Henry C. Lea,
Philadelphia, 1866.
The development of peace is an example of evolution. It is not to
be supposed it will be easily attained. All the forces of history, however,
point out that it is in order at the present time. One hundred years from
now, when China has been industrialized and politically organized,
when Russia has been developed, when the teeming millions of India
and the Malay Peninsula have attained organized industrial development
and government, the United States may not be the strongest nation in
the world. As a matter of fact, its existence may depend on an established, orderly procedure for the settlement of disputes. It is in our
national interest at the present time to set such a system under way, as
well as in the interests of humanity in general.

